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Abstract—Home users face increasingly higher risks of 
privacy loss and struggle with the difficult task of protecting 
large volumes of personal information. Most privacy research 
assumes that users have uniform privacy requirements. The main 
problem with this approach is that research has also shown that 
users have different privacy attitudes and expectations based 
upon a variety of factors, including (but not limited to) gender, 
age and education level. Privacy therefore can mean different 
things in different contexts, to different people at different times. 
For example, some uses are less concerned regarding the sharing 
and use of their location information while others will be very 
concerned. Therefore, it is important to factor these 
requirements in to a privacy-awareness model that can enhance 
user’s awareness and make more informed decisions to reduce 
their specific degree of exposure. The quantity and range of 
sensitive information also requires approaches that give users 
back the control over their data. Therefore, prioritization of 
privacy-related information based on an individual user basis 
should be utilised to ensure relevant and timely notification about 
privacy-related information that is important to the user. This 
paper presents a critical analysis of the current state of the art 
and proposes a novel mobile-based architecture to provide users 
with effective and usable privacy protection. 
Keywords— Privacy in mobile computing; Context-aware 
privacy control. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The number of Internet users has increased dramatically since 
the millennium, with the first billion users being reached in 
2005, the second billion by 2010, and the third in 2014 [1]. 
The growth of users has also coincided with an increase in the 
range of devices that can access the Internet – with 
smartphones, smart watches, tablets, smart TVs, game 
consoles all being very popular. Indeed, 60% of UK adult 
online users use at least two devices every day and nearly 25% 
use three devices  [2].  
However, with the rapid growth of these devices, activities, 
services and information, the enormous amount of private and 
personal information that is stored has also increased. 
Therefore, users are becoming increasingly concerned about 
their personal information, how it is used, by whom and where 
it is stored [3]. For instance a Consumer Report found that 
92% of British and U.S. Internet users are concerned about 
their privacy online [4]. When users became aware of online 
privacy issues, they were asked what made them most worried 
about their online privacy: 45% of British Internet users stated 
that it is personal information being shared between 
companies [4]. In addition, 89% of users avoided these 
companies because they believed that companies do not 
protect their privacy. It was also found that 76% of Internet 
users limited their online activity in the last 12 months due to 
these concerns [4]. This evidence indicates that users are 
sufficiently worried about their online privacy. 
Users are also concerned about lack of control over their 
personal information as they are often unaware of what 
information an application collects about them [5]. Fifty 
percent of UK-based Internet users reported they wanted 
control over who has access to their personal information [4]. 
The lack of control over their personal information may 
decrease willingness to share sensitive information. For 
example, a study by Brandimarte et al. found when users who 
have control over their personal information, are willing to 
share more [6].  
Due to users concerns about privacy protection, most mobile 
operating systems such as Android and iOS provide some 
privacy safeguards for users [7]. Despite these provisions, 
there are several usability issues related to the functionality 
and interface. For instance, Kelley et al. found that users 
struggle to understand the permissions in Android due to the 
lack of usability [7]. Furthermore, several studies have shown 
that privacy interfaces, whether for iOS or Android, did not 
provide users with sufficient information or control [8–10]. 
Therefore, the Federal Trade Commission suggested privacy 
controls need more improvement to protect users’ privacy 
[11].  
Focus has been given to the development of policies, 
procedures and tools that aid an end-user in managing and 
understanding their privacy-related information. However, 
these approaches assume that users can correctly configure all 
resulting settings and they have uniform privacy requirements. 
In reality, users do have different privacy concerns and 
requirements as they have heterogeneous privacy attitudes and 
expectations [12]. For example, some users consider personal 
information such as age, address and gender in their profile on 
a social network being more sensitive than others [13]. 
Furthermore, in practice it is unrealistic to assume 
homogeneous privacy requirements across a whole population 
[14].  
Accordingly, there is a need to for an approach that considers 
individual requirements in a centralised and usable manner to 
meet users’ needs. This paper, building upon an analysis of the 
current state of the art, will identify the requirements of such a 
privacy tool and propose a framework to realise it. 
Section 2 presents an analysis background literature, followed 
by Section 3 presenting the problem statement. The proposed 
framework is presented in Section 4. The conclusions and 
future work are presented in Section 5. 
II. BACKGROUND LITERATURE  
Most of the prior studies focus upon how to develop useful 
techniques to detect and manage the leakage of sensitive 
personal information. Numerous techniques have been 
proposed to monitor personal information, for example, 
monitoring permissions, mobile network traffic and static and 
dynamic analysis. A total of 14 papers have been identified and 
categorised into three domains based on the purpose of each 
tool:  
• Information ﬂow analysers (4 papers): 
• Finer grain privacy controls (8 papers): 
• Privacy proﬁles (2 papers): 
A. Information ﬂow analysers: 
Many tools have been developed in recent years that aim to 
analyse and to detect the personal information on mobile 
platforms. These tools analyse mobile apps regarding potential 
privacy breaches before they leave the system via untrusted 
apps. Some of the more prominent examples are, Taintdroid 
[15], AppIntent [16], Little BrothersWatching You, and PiOS 
Taintdroid was designed to detect the sensitive data when it 
leaves the system via untrusted applications [15]. It was 
designed based on a dynamic approach which is executed 
whilst a program is in operation. The system can track the flow 
of data through four levels: variable, method, message, and ﬁle. 
Although, TaintDroid detects the sensitive data, the system 
assumes that users can correctly configure all the resulting 
settings. Therefore, this approach could impose an undue 
burden on the users. In addition, they do not examine the 
usability related to the interface displayed to users. 
In comparison, [17] presented a solution that focuses on the 
user’s awareness of privacy issues. The solution improves 
user’s understanding of potential privacy leakages. It is built 
based upon the TaintDroid platform and helps users to know 
the frequency and destination of data being shared by an 
application. It also provides users interfaces in order to inform 
users about which privacy sensitive information leaves the 
phone. However, they do not provide users control over their 
personal information to allow them to specify which type of 
information that they prefer not to leave the phone.  
Unlike previous studies that simply consider the 
transmission of private data, AppIntent  determines if 
transmission is user intended or not because transmission of 
sensitive data in itself does not necessarily indicate privacy 
leakage [16]. AppIntent was designed to distinguish between 
user-intended data transmission from user unintended and 
develop an event-space constraint guided symbolic execution 
technique. This technique can reduce the event search space in 
symbolic execution for Android apps. Symbolic execution is 
used to determine the right input that makes the program to 
execute. AppIntent develops a new symbolic execution 
technique called event-space constraint guided symbolic 
execution for Android apps in order to avoid the possibly of the 
path explosion problem during symbolic execution. The 
researchers apply static analysis first to identify the possible 
execution paths that lead to the sensitive data transmission 
under analysis (such as sending SMS). Then they use these 
paths to generate event-space constraints. However, the 
evaluations should conduct with varying number of 
participants in order to identify the user acceptance of the 
system.  
Another tool that aims to analyse programs for possible 
leaks of sensitive information from a mobile device to third 
party is PiOS. It detected privacy leaks related to device ID, 
location and phone number. Moreover, PiOS considered the 
address book, browser history, and photos. PiOS uses static 
analysis to detect data flows. They have analysed more than 
1,400 iPhone apps and they found that a majority of apps leak 
the device ID, which can provide detailed information about 
the habits of a user. However, PSiOS does not provide user a 
fine grain control over their personal information.  
B. Finer grain privacy controls: 
A number of research prototypes have also offered used 
fine grain controls in order to prevent potential privacy 
leakages. For example, AppFence [18], TISSA [19], 
AntMonitor [20] and  ProtectMyPrivacy [21].  There are 
several techniques were used to enhance information flow 
control for mobile.  
AppFence uses replacing information approach in order to 
protect sensitive data [18]. AppFence provides users two 
privacy controls to protect sensitive resources: shadowing and 
blocking. Sometimes users do not want to provide application 
access to sensitive data. Therefore, AppFence sends shadow 
data instead of the actual data. For example, when application 
requires access to user’s contacts, AppFence may provide 
application shadow data that contains no contact entries, 
contains only those genuine entries not considered sensitive by 
the user, or that contains shadow entries that are entirely 
fictional. The second approach for protecting sensitive data is 
blocking sensitive data from being exfiltrated off the device. 
AppFence uses TaintDroid information flow tracking to track 
the sensitive data and prevent information from transmissions 
of these data out of the device. However, the system does not 
alert users about how applications use data and whether they 
will exhibit side effects if privacy controls are applied. In order 
to know whether side effects impact user-desired functionality, 
it needs to consult users each time. In this case, the system may 
places a high level of burden on users.  
The Taming Information Stealing Smartphone Applications 
(TISSA) provides user with a fine-grained control over 
disclosure of their personal information and consists of three 
main components [19].  TISSA was designed to protect four 
types of personal information: phone identity, location, 
contacts, and call log. The first one is the privacy setting 
content provider. It contains the current privacy settings for 
untrusted apps on the mobile device. It also provides users an 
interface in order to query the current privacy settings for an 
untrusted app (e.g., a location manager). In order to protect the 
personal information, TISSA provides users the empty or 
bogus options for personal information that may be requested 
by the app. The second component is the privacy-setting 
manager. It allows users to manage or update the privacy 
settings for installed apps. The third component contains 
content providers or services to regulate the access for four 
types of personal information: phone identity, location, 
contacts, and call log. For example, when an app requires 
access to private data, the system will query the privacy 
settings, and response to the requests according to the current 
privacy settings for the app. However, it is difficult for an 
average user to determine which type of permission is high or 
low risk for the app because he does not know the reason about 
permission requirements for individual apps. Additionally, the 
system does not assist the user to make the right choice in order 
to reduce the burden on mobile users.  
In order to enhance privacy control, DROIDFORCE 
proposed another approach to enforce privacy controls based 
on a user’s policy [22]. DROIDFORCE works at the 
application level. It targets apps with static data flow analysis 
to identify strategic policy enforcement points whether for a 
single application or for multiple applications at the same 
time. These policies may depend on data that available only at 
runtime. However, their policies allow or deny an activity, 
while do not provide users with finer control over the 
information. Additionally, the study does not show how users 
had could understand these policies to make informed 
decision. 
PrivacyGuard [23] and AntMonitor [20] provide fine 
grained privacy control and provide ground truth mapping of 
packets to applications. They used an approach which analyses 
actual network traffic of Android using VPNService API to 
intercept traffic. This approach does not require root 
permissions and is portable to all devices with Android version 
4.0 or later. The AntMonitor system consists of three 
components: an Android application, AnyClient, and two 
server applications, AntServer and LogServ. Whilst 
PrivacyGuard runs in its entirety on the local device. The 
purpose of the client-side analysis is to protect users in real 
time and provide fine grained privacy control. However, 
LogServer works as the central repository to store and analyse 
all network traffic data and does not have to analyse a large 
amount of live traffic compared to AntServer. To evaluate 
AntMonitor system, they recruited student volunteers to use 
AntClient on their phones. The system collects the packets of 
the applications that the volunteers selected and stores them at 
LogServer in order to check whether any of the installed 
applications are sending the personal data out to the Internet. 
They found that 44% and 66% of the users have applications 
that leak their International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) 
and Android Device ID respectively. However, both 
PrivacyGuard and AntMonitor assume that average users can 
correctly specify their personal information to allow the system 
to detect them when they leave their mobiles. In this case, these 
solutions does not help user to overcome the burden associated 
with managing such a large number of data.  
ProtectMyPrivacy (PMP) provides users fine grained 
privacy for each app in order to send the anonymized data 
instead of privacy sensitive information [21]. It detects privacy 
leaks on iOS Applications. The type of the data that PMP 
protects is unique device identifier, IMEI, Wi-Fi MAC address 
and Bluetooth MAC address. Another private data type that 
PMP protects is the user’s address book. It includes names, 
addresses, phone numbers and emails because some apps 
upload these information to a server without user’s permission. 
When the app wants to access to the private data, PMP allows 
the user to deny or allow the app to access private data in real 
time. Hence, PMP provides user two options to protect his 
address book: user can allow the app to access his address book 
or allow PMP to sends an alternative address book, filled with 
fictitious entries (names, emails and phone numbers). 
Additionally, they have developed a crowdsourcing system to 
help user to make informed decisions, which provides app 
specific privacy recommendations. However, the system just 
deals with mere access to private data, but does not address 
privacy once the data leaves the app. Moreover, the system 
does not provide each user personalized recommendations. 
Each user has its own privacy preferences. Therefore, it would 
be helpful to take account of user’s profile when the system 
generates recommendations, in order to make a more personal 
recommendation. 
Other studies have proposed approaches that do not rely on 
one operating system but can run on different mobile systems. 
Nadkarni and Enck [24] proposed Aquifer as a policy 
framework in modern operating systems such as Android, iOS, 
and Windows 8, which performs two types of restrictions that 
protect the entire User Interface (UI) workflow defining the 
user task and ensure only specific apps can export the data to 
the host. Aquifer provides each application a control over 
sensitive data therefore can contribute to the security 
restrictions. However, Aquifer does not show users the privacy 
policy of an application. Additionally, it does not provide users 
comprehensive tracking the sensitive data because just focus on 
the UI workflow that send data to another application. 
Labyrinth [25] also supports both Android and iOS. 
Labyrinth a system to detect access to private data by using 
privacy enforcement system that automatically detects leakage 
of private data originating from standard and application-
specific sources. Labyrinth contains a Packet Analyser that 
collects all the data application that sends to any remote Server. 
When the data is collected, Packet Analyser detects if private 
data has been sent in the clear. Then the system will terminate 
any unauthorized communication of private data in the clear 
between the client and the server via the proxy interface. 
Moreover, Labyrinth is equipped with an integrated Visual 
Configuration Framework in order to identify the private 
information that Labyrinth should protect. Therefore, when 
application access the private information via user input or 
through standard libraries, Labyrinth compared the data that is 
collected at run time by the Packet Analyser with the data that 
is collected by the instrumentation layer. If a match is found, a 
confidentiality warning is reported. Visually configuring, is 
directly atop the application’s UI and it does not require 
operating-system instrumentation. In order to improve the 
usability of the security administration of a mobile application, 
the visual configuration provides users the type of data that 
may leak from application at run time. However, it is not 
feasible to notify users for each leak from application at run 
time. Constant notification for each leak from application may 
affect the user acceptance of the system. Additionally, 
configuring the privacy policy each time may places a high 
level of burden on users. It would be helpful to take account of 
users’ choices, in order to make a more personal policy.  
C. Privacy proﬁles: 
A few studies have proposed modelling and predicting 
users’ privacy preferences [26] [27]. Frank et al. cluster 
188,389 Android apps and 27,029 Facebook apps to find 
patterns in permission requests [26] . They used a probabilistic 
method to extract permission request patterns from Android 
and Facebook apps. They identified over 30 common patterns 
of permission requests. However, they looked for permission 
request patterns in Android apps but they do not identify 
patterns in user privacy preferences.  
Liu et al analysed the permissions users granted to mobile 
apps on Android and realized that the permission model is too 
complex and they can find patterns in permission requests [27]. 
They used machine learning clustering algorithms to split users 
into a small number of profiles based on their decisions to grant 
or deny apps the access to different permissions. Their result 
showed that it is possible to significantly reduce user burden 
while allowing users to better control their mobile app 
permissions. However, they do not elicit user’s privacy 
preferences in a context where they are not just about the 
permissions requested by an app but also about type of 
information, app categories, data location, time of access data, 
the entity access to data, data usage and the level of data. 
III. Discussion 
The aforementioned studies aim to alert users by 
developing tools in order to emphasise privacy violating 
information on many applications. The majority of existing 
research has focussed upon the technical aspect to protect the 
privacy of users. They have shown that is possible to monitor 
sensitive information for users in real time. The majority of 
studies used a dynamic approach to monitor personal 
information for users. Whilst, a few studies used network 
approach to detect information leak in mobile as shown in the 
Table 1.  
A number of research prototypes have not only monitored 
sensitive information for users but also provided user control 
over the personal information such as AntMonitor [20], 
ProtectMyPrivacy [21] and Labyrinth [25]. However, most 
studies have often assumed that users have uniform privacy 
requirements. Current research approaches to privacy are 
usually fundamentally static in nature. By contrast, personal 
information is dynamic because privacy preferences are diverse 
from time to time. For instance, some users are willing to share 
their locations for period of time with some groups such as 
close friends, family, Facebook friends and friends at work. 
Another example, some users may share their locations during 
certain hours of the day or days of the week. Therefore, there 
are a number of critical dimensions to these preferences, 
including time of day, day of week, and relevant groups. 
Furthermore, a number of studies on the assessment of 
privacy risks assume that the value of each personal 
information is perceived similarly across all information. Few 
studies measure the users' privacy risk when they use 
applications. Some have used colour to inform user about the 
level of the risk. Other studies use the score to identify the level 
of the risk. However, it is difficult to quantify and measure 
privacy. First, the level of privacy differs from user to user. 
Second, users’ preferences may change over time. In addition, 
the prior art has not presented a holistic assessment but rather 
focusing upon one aspect of privacy such as web or mobile 
applications. This makes privacy measurement more 
challenging. 
TABLE I.  A REVIEW FOR THE MONITORING TECHNIQUES AND 
PRIVACY CONTROL 
N System Monitoring Techniques Privacy 
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1 TaintDroid     
2 Little 
BrothersWatching 
You 
    
3 AppFence     
4 TISSA     
5 AppIntent     
6 DROIDFORCE     
7 PrivacyGuard     
8 AntMonitor     
9 PiOS     
10 PMP     
11 Aquifer     
12 Labyrinth     
 
Moreover, some approaches allow users to know potential 
risk to their privacy and invite them to change their settings 
such as AntMonitor system [20]. However, it is difficult for 
average users to identify the level of the privacy – in particular, 
when the user changes privacy preferences from time to time. 
This could place a burden on users and could have a negative 
effect on initial adoption. 
From the usability prospective, a few studies related to 
privacy focus on usability issues in order to increase the user 
awareness. The most prevalent method for privacy alerts is to 
inform users about potential single data leakage. This method 
does not consider long-term aspects such as frequency of 
access to the personal information. For example, some 
applications may access the location every hour for one week 
whilst users may not allow the application to access it in 
specific occasions for personal reasons. The evaluations of 
these studies do not conduct with varying groups of 
participants in order to identify the user acceptance of the 
system. In addition, the studies lack of statistical power 
because the total numbers of participants were small. None of 
these studies introducing a history view to allow users to know 
who has accessed their data when and at which degree of 
granularity. Current approaches present the same content of the 
interface for all users. Therefore, current approaches design 
static user interfaces. Some users may want to know more 
information about the potential privacy risks while others may 
not want to take the time to read the warnings in detail. 
IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
It is envisaged that a novel architecture for user privacy will 
encompass the core functionality to allow for personalisation, 
adaptive interfaces and user feedback. Privacy preferences are 
diverse and cannot adequately be captured by one size-fits-all 
default settings because the level of privacy differs from user to 
user. Eventually, this needs to result in a privacy 
profile/configuration unique to each individual. However, 
understanding and adapting to an individual’s specific 
preferences is challenging without overly burdening them at 
the initial setup. Therefore, in order to cater to different user 
preferences and expectations initially, user profiling could be 
utilised to cluster users into a smaller number of privacy 
profiles. Moreover, applying privacy profiles as default settings 
for initial interfaces could significantly reduce burden and 
frustration of the user. The system also will provide users with 
an adaptive and usable user interface in order to increase user 
awareness about potential privacy risks. As users are different 
and therefore have different needs from an interactive system. 
Adaptive interfaces can assist in providing personalisation and 
supporting flexibility. Figure 1 illustrates an architecture 
beginning with an initial interface that displays a series of 
questions related to users’ demographic information, aiming at 
clustering users into a smaller number of privacy profiles. 
Then, the system will update personal privacy preferences of 
the user based on their interactions. Updating personal privacy 
preferences would enable the system to create individual 
privacy profiles in order to adapt an individual’s specific 
preferences without overly burdening them. The system also 
provides user adaptive interface. In this case, the system could 
meet personal privacy preferences and personal visualisation. 
The proposed architecture consists of a number of key 
components. An outline description of the components is 
provided below: 
Monitor: the monitoring component is responsible to 
dynamically monitor the information related to individual user. 
In particular, when the information leaves apps. The monitor is 
real-time privacy monitoring.  
Privacy Profile Refinement: the function of this 
component which is obtained a more care is to refine user 
profiles that were derived from system logs. It is responsible to 
update personal privacy preferences for induvial users based on 
users’ interaction that stored in System Log. The Privacy 
Profile Refinement then takes the System Log as input and tries 
to match the information related to user with current user 
profile to observe if there is any change in order to update the 
user profile. 
System Log: the main task of System Log is going to 
perform collecting a wider dataset of all information which is 
related to capture the user interaction with users’ personal 
information. 
Privacy Manager: this is the core component of the 
proposed system. The main function for privacy manager is to 
control the processing between each element. When the system 
chooses a privacy profiles that closely captured users’ 
preferences from Profile storage, the Privacy Manager passes 
users’ preferences to the Monitor in order to monitor these 
information. In order to update the personal privacy 
preferences for induvial users, the Privacy Manager will keep 
passing the privacy preferences from the Privacy Profile 
Refinement to The monitor.  
User Privacy Profile: in order to assign user to the privacy 
profiles that most closely capture their privacy preferences, 
initial interface will display a series of questions related to 
users’ demographic information such gender, age and 
education level when the user logs to the system first time. 
Based on the user’s answers, the User Privacy Profile will 
determine the most closely privacy profile from the user profile 
storage.  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Architectural overview of adaptive user interface 
Adaptive Interface: the main goal for Adaptive Interface is 
to notify the user about potential privacy risks based on the 
users’ preferences. In this case, the presenting of information 
and notification will dynamically change, when the system 
updates users’ preferences. For example, some users want to 
know more information about the potential privacy risks such 
as who had access to which data and when. In contrast, other 
users may not want to take the time to read the warnings in 
detail. Therefore, it would be useful to design an interface that 
is customized to the needs and desires of their specific users. 
Adaptive Interface aims to raising user awareness about 
privacy threats. Ultimately, this is the user-facing component 
of the system and therefore its design is of key importance. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK  
This paper reviewed the existing privacy awareness tools in 
order to critically evaluate the current state of the art. It was 
notable that few studies consider that the personal information 
is different from time to time and from person to person- taking 
a very generic approach to privacy.  
It is evidence however that users do have different privacy 
concerns and requirements because users have heterogeneous 
privacy attitudes and expectations. Further research will build 
upon the architecture proposed and explore how privacy 
profiles can be developed, alongside adaptive interfaces that 
seek to optimise usability and convenience yet improve 
awareness.  
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